Jump to content

Battle of Mycale

Coordinates: 37°41′27″N 27°09′27″E / 37.6909°N 27.1574°E / 37.6909; 27.1574
This is a good article. Click here for more information.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Mycale
Part of the Second Persian invasion of Greece and the Greek counterattack
Color photograph of a barren grey mountain, with a small forest at its foothills. Ruined Greek columns can be seen in front of the forest.
Part of Mount Mycale, viewed from the ruins of Priene.
DateAugust 27 or 28, 479 BC
Location
Mycale, Ionia
(modern-day Aydın, Turkey)
Result Greek victory
Territorial
changes		 Persia loses the Aegean islands, Ionia begins second revolt against Persian rule
Belligerents
 Achaemenid Empire
Commanders and leaders
Strength
40,000 men
110 ships		 60,000 men
300 ships
Casualties and losses
Considerable Most of the army and all the ships

The Battle of Mycale (Ancient Greek: Μάχη τῆς Μυκάλης; Machē tēs Mykalēs) was one of the two major battles (the other being the Battle of Plataea) that ended the second Persian invasion of Greece during the Greco-Persian Wars. It took place on August 27 or 28, 479 BC on the slopes of Mount Mycale on the coast of Ionia opposite the island of Samos. The battle was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states, including Sparta, Athens and Corinth, and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I.

The previous year, the Persian invasion force, led by Xerxes himself, had scored victories at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium, and conquered Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica; however, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the allied Greek navies had won an unlikely victory, and therefore prevented the conquest of the Peloponnese. Xerxes then retreated, leaving his general Mardonius with a substantial army to finish off the Greeks the following year.

In the summer of 479 BC, the Greeks assembled an army, and marched to confront Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea. At the same time, the allied fleet sailed to Samos, where the demoralized remnants of the Persian navy were based. The Persians, seeking to avoid a battle, beached their fleet below the slopes of Mycale, and, with the support of a Persian army group, built a palisaded camp. The Greek commander Leotychides decided to attack the Persians anyway, landing the fleet's complement of marines to do so.

Although the Persian forces put up sturdy resistance, the heavily armored Greek hoplites eventually routed the Persian troops, who fled to their camp. The Ionian Greek contingents in the Persian army defected, and the camp was assailed, with a large number of Persians slaughtered. The Persian ships were then captured and burned. The complete destruction of the Persian navy, along with the destruction of Mardonius' army at Plataea, allegedly on the same day as the Battle of Mycale, decisively ended the invasion of Greece. After Plataea and Mycale, the allied Greeks would take the offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars.

Background

[edit]
Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars, First Persian invasion of Greece, and Second Persian invasion of Greece

After Xerxes I was crowned the emperor of the Achaemenid Empire, he quickly resumed preparations for the invasion of Greece, including building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed, generally referred to as the Allies.[1] In August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the vastly outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by the Persians who used an unknown mountain path.[2]

A map centered on modern day Greece, Bulgaria and Western Turkey showing the territories of the Achaemenid Empire and the Greek city states.
A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle.

After Thermopylae, the Persian army had burned and sacked the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae, before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth.[3] The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with a minor portion of his army.[3]

The Persian fleet had been stationed in Samos in order to defend Ionia and avert an Ionian revolt. The Persians were not expecting the Greeks to mount a naval attack on the other end of the Aegean Sea, because the Greeks had not followed through on their victory at Salamis by chasing the Persian fleet. However, the morale of the Persian fleet was breaking, and they were anxiously awaiting new reports on the status of the land army led by Mardonius. According to historian Charles Hignett, it was clear that only the triumph of the Persian land army in Greece could sustain Persian rule in Ionia.[4]

Xerxes left Mardonius with most of his army, and the latter decided to camp for the winter in Thessaly.[3] The 110 ships of the Greek fleet were anchored at Aegina under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides in the spring of 479 BC. Six people from Chios who had made an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Strattis, their ruling tyrant, escaped to Sparta. They requested the Spartan ephors to free Ionia, and the latter sent them to Leotychides.[5] They managed to persuade the Greek fleet to move to Delos.[6] The Greeks would hesitate to sail farther than Delos; because they were unfamiliar with the lands which lay there, thought they were full of armed peoples and believed the journey was too long. The Greek and Persian fleets stayed in their positions, apprehensive of moving closer to their opponent.[7]

Meanwhile, the Athenian navy under Xanthippus had joined with the Allied fleet off Delos. They were then approached by a delegation from Samos under the leadership of Hegesistratos, who suggested that the Ionian cities were eager to revolt.[a] They also pointed out the poor morale and reduced seaworthiness of the Persian fleet,[b] the latter occurring probably due to the long time it had spent at sea.[10] Leotychides found Hegesistratos' name to be a good omen, since it meant "Army Leader". The delegation from Samos, as envoys of their nation, pledged their loyalty to the Hellenic alliance.[11] Leotychides and the council of war decided to exploit this opportunity and sailed for Samos.[12] The Persians sailed from Samos; Hignett argues that by doing so, they left to the Greeks an advantageous post which was the strongest on the Ionian coast.[9]

A map centered on southern Greece showing the movements of the Greek army with dark blue arrows and the Persian army with red arrows.
Movements of the Persian and Greek armies in 480–479 BC.

The historians Michael Flower and John Marincola argue that the Greeks may have decided to sail to Samos only because they were told about a potential Ionian revolt and about the disrepair of the Persian fleet. Flower and Marincola note that the Greeks had previously been quite hesitant to sail beyond Delos because of the Persian fleet.[6] The historian Marcello Lupi also notes that the Greek fleet had sailed at the insistence of the Samians and had been unwilling to chase the Persians after Salamis, hesitating to move out of Delos.[13]

Flower and Marincola argue that the envoys from Samos were more reliable than the envoys from Chios, since the latter were "conspirators on the run" while the former were representatives of their people.[14] They note how Hegesistratos had pointed out that there was a chance the Persian fleet could be seized with one maneuver. They argue that Leotychides may have considered this a risk he could take. They also note that the Greek fleet had already sailed for Samos when their ambassadors reported the dismissal of the Phoenician ships from the Persian fleet.[15] The historian Peter Green argues that the Phoenician ships were dismissed either to defend the shores of Thrace and the Dardanelles; or because the Persian high command could not trust the Phoenicians after Salamis.[16] Hignett argues that Leotychides was taking the risk of fighting a naval battle where the location and circumstances would be picked by the Persians, who could thus maximize their advantages.[17]

Opposing forces

[edit]

Persians

[edit]

Herodotus gives the size of the Persian fleet, which wintered at Cyme, at 300 ships. The Phoenician ships were dismissed from the Persian fleet before the battle, which reduced its strength further.[18] The historian Charles Hignett found the fleet size of 300 ships to be too large, even if this number included the Phoenician ships.[4] Tigranes was the commander of the Persian land forces at Mycale.[19] Artaÿntes was the joint commander of the Persian fleet, and he appointed his nephew, Ithamitres, as the third commander of the fleet.[20] Herodotus states that there were 60,000 soldiers in the Persian army.[21]

Hignett argues that Herodotus' own narrative of the battle contradicts these numbers, and claims that Tigranes could not have had more than 10,000 soldiers in his corps.[22] Shepherd also estimates that Tigranes had around 10,000 soldiers; with an additional 3,000 Persian infantry who had disembarked from the ships. Shepherd also notes that Tigranes notably did not have cavalry contingents among his troops.[23] Green estimates that there were approximately only 100 ships in the Persian fleet after the Phoenicians left. He also estimates that Tigranes had only 6,000 soldiers with him, who were joined by the 4,000 marines in the Persian fleet, for a total of 10,000 combatants.[24]

An illustration on a circular surface in golden-yellow watercolor. A standing Greek soldier with a unicorn shield is sword fighting with a lunging Persian soldier wearing a drooping cap.
Greek hoplite (right) and Persian warrior (left), fighting each other. Ancient kylix, 5th century BC.

Greeks

[edit]

The historian Andrew Robert Burn [Wikidata] estimates the Greek fleet to have had 110 ships.[25] Burn notes that the figure of 250 ships is only stated by Ephorus.[12] The standard complement of a trireme was 200 people, including 14 marines.[26] Flower and Marincola estimate that the Greeks had 3,300 marines, with the 110 ships having 30 marines each. They note that the complement of marines on a trireme was probably not fixed, with Plutarch stating that there were 14 marines on each trireme at Salamis. Herodotus had stated that the Chian ships at the Battle of Lade had carried 40 marines each.[27] Hignett also arrives at an estimate of 3,300 marines in the Greek force. He argues that there could not have been more than 6,000 marines even if there were hoplites employed as rowers.[28] This suggests that a trireme could probably carry a maximum of 40 to 45 soldiers, because triremes seem to have been easily destabilized by extra weight.[29]

Burn notes that the Greek contingent of marines was strong, and strongly considers the possibility that some of the Greek oarsmen could have served as light infantry.[12] The historian George Cawkwell argues that the Greeks would have had only 2,000 to 3,000 marines, because their ships had mostly naval personnel onboard.[30] Flower and Marincola argue that the Athenians did not have the numbers to provide marines for 50 triremes and 8,000 hoplites at Plataea both at the same time. They thus argue that the claim of 250 ships in the Greek fleet is not realistic.[15] Flower and Marincola also note that Leotychides and Xanthippus probably had equal powers, and that the military decisions were finalized by a majority vote.[31]

Herodotus did not give a precise order of battle for Mycale in his account. The historian William Shepherd estimates that Athens provided one-third of the ships; while Sparta and the Peloponnesian poleis may have contributed 10 and 20-30 ships respectively. Shepherd estimates that Aegina and Corinth sent 10 ships each, and argues that the allied Greek contingent at Mycale could not have had more than 25,000 soldiers. Shepherd arrives at an estimate of 3,000 marines with 30 on each ship; and argues that the remaining 22,000 would have served mostly as light infantry with some of them being employed as hoplites.[32] Green's estimate for the number of Greek combatants was 5,000 heavy infantry and 2,000 to 3,000 sailors serving as light infantry.[33]

Prelude

[edit]

When the Persians heard that the Allied fleet was approaching, they set sail from Samos towards Mycale in the Ionian mainland, possibly because they had decided they could not fight a naval battle. During the chaos of their retreat, the Samians freed 500 Athenian captives.[34] Burn argues that the Persian fleet had anchored at Mycale because their commanders thought it would be "useless to fight at sea".[25] Cawkwell notes that the Persian fleet had moved from Samos to Mycale for protection according to Herodotus.[21] Green argues that the Persians retreated to Mycale because they could communicate easily with Sardis and retreat without trouble.[24] The Persians arrived on the southern shore of Mycale, near a temple dedicated to the two Potnia (female goddesses), Demeter and Kore (Persephone). Another temple dedicated to Eleusinian Demeter was nearby; three temples dedicated to these same goddesses were also present on or near the battlefield of Plataea.[28]

The Persians took away the armor and weapons of the Samians in their army, finding them unreliable. Furthermore, they sent the Milesians to their rear to guard the passes over Mycale, suspecting that the Milesians might also defect.[34] Hignett argues that this Persian distrust of the Milesians was invented later, and notes that the Milesians were actually guarding the lines of communication and the mountain passes the Persians could use to retreat.[35] To the south of these passes, on the beaches on the route from Samos, the Persians moored their fleet behind the cover of rocks, and built abatis (field fortifications) with the wood they had cut recently.[34] They put up stakes (skolopes) on the ramparts, and as a result, the place where they had camped became known as Skolopoeis by Herodotus' time.[28] With their preparations in place, the Persians decided to defend their position.[34] The camp was located near the Gaison river. The German archaeologist Theodor Wiegand suggested Domatia (modern day Doğanbey, Söke) as the site for the camp; while the German classicist Johannes Kromayer proposed a site near the modern village of Ak Bogaz.[28] Shepherd proposes the village of Atburgazı as the site for the Persian camp and the battlefield.[36]

A color terrain map focused on northwestern Turkey and the islands of Greece. Mount Mycale is at the top center, Lade island is to its immediate south, Samos is to its immediate west and Miletus is to Lade's immediate east.
Map showing position of Mount Mycale in relation to Lade, Samos and Miletus.

The Greeks encamped at Kalamoi, adjacent to the Heraion of Samos. Because their opponent was inactive, they made plans to not fight a battle, and instead attack the Persian communications center at the Hellespont. However, they decided to attack their opponent and his fleet, and moved towards Mycale.[34] Hignett argues that this decision indicated that the Greeks were sure they could fight a decisive battle. The Greeks prepared for a naval battle in the event the Persians decided to fight at sea, but they had resolved to confront the Persian land army in case there was no naval battle.[37] The Greek fleet moved towards the shore and called on the Ionians to revolt. The Greeks then sailed farther and their soldiers landed in a location beyond the line of sight of their opponents,[34] which Shepherd estimates was 3,000–4,000 metres (9,800–13,100 ft) inside the bay and to the immediate west of the city of Priene.[38] Herodotus reports that as the Allied Greeks approached the Persian camp, rumor spread amongst them of an Allied victory at Plataea earlier on in the day.[34]

The battle

[edit]

The Allies probably formed into two wings. On the left were the Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians and Troezenians; around half of the army, who took up positions starting from the shore and ending at the foothils of Mount Mycale. On the right were the Spartans with the other contingents, deployed on the hills in uneven terrain.[38] The battle of Mycale commenced in the afternoon on the same day as the battle of Plataea,[39] which the historian Paul A. Rahe estimates took place on 27 or 28 August.[40] Hignett also proposes a date in late August.[41] The battle began when the Greek left began fighting with the Persians while their right wing was still crossing the hills. The Persians moved out from their camp and put up their shield wall.[38] Burn argues that Tigranes wanted to vanquish half of the Greeks facing him while the other half had still not arrived on the battlefield.[42] Green argues that sending only the flank led by the Athenians at first was actually a tactical move by Leotychides, who wanted the Persians to think they had a large advantage in numbers. Green argues that the Persians fell for the ruse and rushed to attack the Greeks.[43]


The Greek right, under heavy arrow fire, decided to fight in close quarters. Until the Persian shield wall was unbroken, the Persians defended their position. The Greeks managed to break through the wall by shoving. The Persians fought back initially, but then broke their lines and escaped to their camp. The soldiers of the right wing followed them into the camp, and most of the Persian soldiers fled from the camp, except the ethnic Persian troops, who grouped together and fought the Allied soldiers who had entered the camp. Finally, the left wing arrived, outflanking the camp and falling on the rear of the remaining Persian forces, thereby completing the rout.[44]

Color diagram of the positions and movements at the Battle of Mycale. The shoreline runs at the bottom and is marked with a black line, the Gaison river runs from top to down in the center and is marked dark blue, the Spartan and Athenian wings are marked maroon on the left side of the Gaison. The Persian line is marked purple on the right of the Gaison, with their camp to their rear near the shoreline, shaded in purple.
Schematic diagram of the Battle of Mycale.

Herodotus tells us that, on seeing the outcome of the battle hung in the balance, the disarmed Samians had joined in on the side of the allies, doing what they could. This inspired the other Ionian contingents to turn on the Persians as well. Meanwhile, the Milesians who were guarding the passes of Mycale also turned on the Persians. At first they misdirected the fleeing Persian contingents so that they ended up back amongst the Allied troops; then, perhaps seeing the outcome of the battle was certain, they began killing the fleeing Persians.[45] The Greeks then burned the Persian fleet after a heavily contested fight with the Persian marines,[25] after taking out the loot from the ships to the beach.[46] The Persian fortifications were also burnt.[47]

Herodotus does not mention specific figures for casualties, merely saying that losses were heavy on both sides. The Sicyonians in particular suffered,[48] also losing their general Perilaus.[45] On the Persian side, the admiral Mardontes and the general Tigranes were both killed, though Artaÿntes and Ithamitres escaped.[49] Green estimates the Persian casualties at 4,000.[50]

Aftermath

[edit]
Main articles: Battle of Plataea and Greco-Persian Wars

With the twin victories of Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover, the threat of a future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried that Xerxes would try again, over time it became apparent that the Persian desire to conquer Greece was much diminished. The Greeks returned to Samos and discussed their next moves.[51] The Allied fleet then sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this had already been done. The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians. The Persians in the region, and their allies, made for Sestos, the strongest town in the region, and the Athenians laid siege to them there. After a protracted siege, Sestos fell to the Athenians, marking the beginning of a new phase in the Greco-Persian Wars, the Greek counterattack.[52]

After the battle, there were concerns over how the Greeks of Asia Minor could be defended from Persian vengeance. The Peloponnesians suggested a population exchange, where the Greeks who did not want to live under Persian rule would be relocated in northern Greece, on the properties of the medizers who would be expelled. However, since all of northern Greece had surrendered to the Persians, this plan was abandoned. Also, Xanthippus had claimed that the Greeks of Asia Minor were Athenian settlers, and thus Athens would not let their settlements be abandoned.[51] Rahe argues that Athens was actually trying to make its settlers stay in Ionia because there they could defend Athenian food imports from Crimea.[53] Burn found this idea of a population exchange to have parallels with the population exchange between Greece and Turkey implemented 24 centuries later.[54][51]

Burn also found a repeat of the Battle of Mycale in the Battle of the Eurymedon, fought by the Athenian general Cimon against the Persians in 466 BC.[55] After the battle, the Persian marshal Masistes would hurl the accusation that the surviving naval commanders were cowards; Burn, however, argues that they survived because they were just trying to get their non-Persian soldiers back to the battlefield.[46] In the spring of 488 BC, the new tyrant of Cilicia appointed by emperor Xerxes would raid the temple of Apollo at Didyma and seize the bronze idol of the deity, in revenge for the Milesians switching sides at Mycale.[56]

Analysis

[edit]

Flower and Marincola note that the speech made by Hegesistratos has many similarities with the speech made by Aristagoras of Miletus, when the latter traveled to Sparta and Athens for gaining allies in support of the Ionian Revolt of 499 BC. They observe that many of the predictions made by Hegesistratos did not materialise: the Ionians did not revolt when the Greeks arrived in Ionia, and did so only after the people of Samos and Miletus rebelled first.[57] They note how odd it is that the Persians did not attack the Greeks while the latter were landing, and quote Demosthenes, who had remarked that a naval landing could not be executed successfully when an opponent who held the land resolved to fight.[58]

The historian George Cawkwell argues that the major military lesson of both Mycale and Plataea was the repeated confirmation of the superiority of the hoplite over the more lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been demonstrated at Marathon. As a result, after the Greco-Persian Wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries.[59] Cawkwell argues that the numbers given by Herodotus are highly overstated. He further argues that the battle was a "very minor affair",[21] but its outcomes were major because it led to an Ionian revolt.[60] Cawkwell observes that the withdrawal of the majority of the Persian fleet just before the battle of Mycale was a grave mistake.[61] Cawkwell argues that Tigranes wouldn't have had a lot of troops with him. He argues that the Persian fleet did not have the required number of soldiers to fight the Greek fleet, and sailed to Mycale because of the presence of Tigranes' troops.[60]

Burn argues that the destruction of the Persian fleet at Mycale allowed Greek fleets absolute freedom of movement.[46] The Persian and Median marines, as well as the Persian regiments in Tigranes' army, were almost completely massacred. In their absence, the Persian vassals had refused to fight and fled.[c][46] The historian Paul A. Rahe argues that the Persians had had ten months since the battle of Salamis to repair their fleet. He further argues that the Persian hesitation to fight a naval battle, despite their numerical superiority, indicated that either the morale of their commanders was shaken, or that they believed the soldiers in their army drawn from their Greek vassals would mutiny.[63] Rahe argues that emperor Xerxes might have been the one who ordered his soldiers not to fight a naval battle and instead beach their ships.[56]

Historiography

[edit]
Main article: Herodotus

The main source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the ancient Greek historian Herodotus. He gives an account of the battle of Mycale in Book Nine of his Histories. The historian Detlev Fehling [de] noted multiple similarities in Herodotus' accounts, which he argued were arbitrary insertions by Herodotus. Fehling noted that the Spartan nauarch (fleet commander) at Mycale had used the same plan used by Themistocles at the Battle of Artemisium, and the Ionian tyrants at the Battle of Lade. Fehling also notes how the shield wall fighting is always concluded by the Athenians in Herodotus' accounts, especially at Plataea and Mycale.[64] Shepherd also notes that there were many similarities between Plataea and Mycale. However, he finds some major differences in the latter battle: the absence of cavalry, the Persian command's lack of trust in their Greek vassal soldiers resulting in lower force strength, and the reversal of Plataea at Mycale where the Greeks were the attackers and the Persians were the defenders.

The historians Michael Flower and John Marincola also found these similarities between the battles of Plataea and Mycale to be suspicious, especially since the victories there gave both Sparta and Athens, respectively, similar triumphs on the same day.[65] Flower and Marincola note that the victory at Mycale was not celebrated by any Athenian orators, who were otherwise proud of their other achievements in the Persian Wars. They argue that this omission was because the leader at Mycale was a Spartan in what could be considered a naval battle, a domain where the Athenians believed they were better.[66] They also note how the aristeia (heroic moment) of the Athenians takes place on Ionian lands, and wonder whether this part of Herodotus' account is structured to justify the Athenian claim to the command of the Delian League.[67]

Burn found Herodotus' account to be biased towards the Athenians. He also finds the battle of Mycale to have parallels with the Battle of Plataea, as both battles saw only one flank engaged in combat, and both witnessed fighting at the shield walls and camps of the Persians.[45] Hignett argues that the similarities between the two battles are not suspicious and can naturally be expected.[68] Burn states that Mycale was a "relatively small battle", and notes how Thucydides does not consider it as important as Salamis or Artemisium.[46]

The ancient Greek historian Plutarch, in his account, had noted the Corinthian gallantry at Mycale.[69] Flower and Marincola find the account of Mycale given by Diodorus Siculus to be unreliable and mixed with arbitrary claims by Ephorus of Cyme, his primary source.[70] They also note that in Herodotus' account, the fallen Greek soldiers are buried after the battle of Thermopylae, but not after the battles of Mycale, Salamis or Marathon.[71]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ The other two members of the delegation from Samos were Lampon, son of Thrasycles; and Athenagoras of Samos, son of Archestratides.[8]
  2. ^ The historian Charles Hignett argues that the poor state of the Persian fleet would not apply to the Ionian squadrons, which had done well at Salamis.[9]
  3. ^ The presence of 30 Persian marines on board the Persian ships did not allow the Greek vassal soldiers onboard to rebel.[62]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Lupi 2017, p. 276.
  2. ^ Lupi 2017, pp. 278–279.
  3. ^ a b c Cawkwell 2005, p. 112.
  4. ^ a b Hignett 1963, p. 247.
  5. ^ Hignett 1963, pp. 247–248.
  6. ^ a b Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 262.
  7. ^ Hignett 1963, p. 248.
  8. ^ Rahe 2015, p. 324.
  9. ^ a b Hignett 1963, p. 252.
  10. ^ Shepherd 2012, p. 80.
  11. ^ Burn 1984, pp. 547–548.
  12. ^ a b c Burn 1984, p. 547.
  13. ^ Lupi 2017, p. 282.
  14. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, pp. 262–263.
  15. ^ a b Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 263.
  16. ^ Green 1996, p. 277.
  17. ^ Hignett 1963, p. 251.
  18. ^ Cawkwell 2005, pp. 99–100.
  19. ^ Burn 1984, p. 335.
  20. ^ Burn 1984, p. 336.
  21. ^ a b c Cawkwell 2005, p. 100.
  22. ^ Hignett 1963, p. 353.
  23. ^ Shepherd 2012, p. 81.
  24. ^ a b Green 1996, p. 278.
  25. ^ a b c Burn 1966, p. 192.
  26. ^ Lazenby 1993, p. 46.
  27. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 275.
  28. ^ a b c d Hignett 1963, p. 255.
  29. ^ Goldsworthy 2003, p. 103.
  30. ^ Cawkwell 2005, p. 99.
  31. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 301.
  32. ^ Shepherd 2012, pp. 79–80.
  33. ^ Green 1996, pp. 280, 282.
  34. ^ a b c d e f g Burn 1984, p. 548.
  35. ^ Hignett 1963, p. 257.
  36. ^ Shepherd 2012, p. 92.
  37. ^ Hignett 1963, p. 254.
  38. ^ a b c Shepherd 2012, p. 84.
  39. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 27.
  40. ^ Rahe 2015, p. 316.
  41. ^ Hignett 1963, p. 249.
  42. ^ Burn 1984, p. 549.
  43. ^ Green 1996, p. 282.
  44. ^ Burn 1984, pp. 549–550.
  45. ^ a b c Burn 1984, p. 550.
  46. ^ a b c d e Burn 1984, p. 551.
  47. ^ Hignett 1963, p. 259.
  48. ^ Hignett 1963, pp. 256–257.
  49. ^ Burn 1984, pp. 335–336, 550.
  50. ^ Green 1996, p. 283.
  51. ^ a b c Burn 1984, p. 552.
  52. ^ Burn 1984, pp. 552–553.
  53. ^ Rahe 2015, p. 333.
  54. ^ Burn 1966, p. 195.
  55. ^ Burn 1966, p. 209.
  56. ^ a b Rahe 2015, p. 327.
  57. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, pp. 263–264.
  58. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 276.
  59. ^ Cawkwell 2005, pp. 251–252.
  60. ^ a b Cawkwell 2005, p. 121, n. 36.
  61. ^ Cawkwell 2005, p. 116.
  62. ^ Burn 1984, p. 502.
  63. ^ Rahe 2015, p. 325.
  64. ^ Fehling 1971, p. 143.
  65. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, pp. 27–28.
  66. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 28, n. 115.
  67. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 280.
  68. ^ Hignett 1963, p. 258.
  69. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 200.
  70. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, pp. 32–33.
  71. ^ Flower & Marincola 2002, p. 254.

Bibliography

[edit]

Books

[edit]
  • Burn, Andrew Robert (1966). The Pelican History of Greece. Penguin Books. ISBN 9780140207927.
  • Burn, Andrew Robert (1984). Persia and the Greeks. The Defence of the West, c. 546-478 B. C. (2nd ed.). Gerald Duckworth & Co. ISBN 9780715617113.
  • Cawkwell, George (2005). The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198148715.001.0001. ISBN 9780198148715.
  • Fehling, Detlev (1971). Die Quellenangaben bei Herodot: Studien zur Erzählkunst Herodots [The Sources of Herodotus: Studies of Herodotus' Narrative Art]. Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte [Studies in Ancient Literature and History] (in German). Vol. 9. De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110841930. ISBN 9783110036343.
  • Flower, Michael A.; Marincola, John (2002). Herodotus. Histories Book IX. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521596503.
  • Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Fall of Carthage. Cassel. ISBN 9780304366422.
  • Green, Peter (1996). The Greco-Persian Wars. University of California Press. doi:10.1525/9780520917064. ISBN 9780520203136.
  • Hignett, Charles (1963). Xerxes' Invasion of Greece. Clarendon Press. ISBN 9780198142478.
  • Lazenby, John Francis (1993). The Defence of Greece, 490-479 B.C. Aris & Phillips. ISBN 9780856685910.
  • Lupi, Marcello (2017). "Sparta and the Persian Wars, 499–478". In Powell, Anton (ed.). A Companion to Sparta. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 269–290. doi:10.1002/9781119072379.ch10. ISBN 9781405188692.
  • Rahe, Paul (2015). The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge. Yale Library of Military History. Yale University Press. doi:10.12987/9780300218602. ISBN 978-0-300-11642-7. JSTOR j.ctvmd857x.
  • Shepherd, William (2012). Plataea 479 BC: The Most Glorious Victory Ever Seen. Osprey Campaign Series. Vol. 239. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781849085540.
[edit]

37°41′27″N 27°09′27″E / 37.6909°N 27.1574°E / 37.6909; 27.1574

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Mycale&oldid=1265963172"